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615 
COMMENTS 
Save the Wealth! Trust Decanting and Oklahoma* 
I. Introduction 
The year is 1948. Amidst the post-World War II boom, the lumber 
industry is thriving. A lumber baron decides to take some of his profits to 
establish a trust for his grandchildren so that they will not have to 
experience the same financial worries that he suffered during the Great 
Depression. As a proud member of the American lumber industry, he 
creates a trust that requires the assets to be invested in domestic timber 
companies. 
Fast forward to present day. You are the beneficiary of that trust, but the 
investment restriction does not permit diversification of the trust assets. In 
the midst of an economic recession and slumping U.S. timber stocks, you 
are left with an asset that yields no return. Your financial adviser 
recommends trust decanting to better provide for your financial future. 
Because the state where you live allows trust decanting, your adviser 
transfers the assets from the existing trust into a new trust that allows for 
diversification, despite the original intent of your lumber baron ancestor to 
limit the sources for investment. 
If this scenario occurred in Oklahoma, you would not have this option. 
Oklahoma does not have a decanting statute, and current Oklahoma trust 
law raises issues with enacting a trust decanting law. Without trust 
decanting, your grandfather’s prudent sacrifice of his own funds for your 
benefit will be for naught. This Comment provides an overview of trust 
decanting and an analysis of existing trust decanting statutes, outlining the 
benefits to be gained by reforming current Oklahoma trust law to allow 
decanting.  
Part II outlines the history, types, and purposes of trusts. It introduces 
trust decanting and describes common issues that arise with existing 
irrevocable trusts that could prompt the need for decanting. Part III surveys 
the states that currently have trust decanting statutes, including a summary 
of the differences in common provisions between the various state statutes.  
Part IV explains the provisions of Oklahoma’s current trust statutes and 
analyzes Oklahoma-specific considerations, including tax consequences 
                                                                                                                 
 * The author wishes to thank Professor Katheleen Guzman for her help and guidance 
throughout law school and in the drafting of this Comment. Additionally, research is critical 
to any scholarly work. The author thanks Professor Joel Wegemer for his assistance in 
identifying and locating relevant and colorful sources of interest. 
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and the impact of Oklahoma’s rule against perpetuities on a potential 
decanting provision. It also examines the societal, familial, and economic 
impacts of a trust decanting statute. Part V provides a recommendation for 
future statutory action.  
Examining statutes enacted by other states highlights the potential 
pitfalls and benefits of enacting similar legislation in Oklahoma. 
Ultimately, such an examination shows that the benefits of trust decanting 
outweigh its faults. Oklahoma should adopt a statute allowing trust 
decanting.  
II. Overview of Trusts and Trust Decanting 
A. Trust Basics 
For the uninitiated, many legal concepts may be dizzying. Even those 
concepts that should be familiar by virtue of common occurrence are often 
convoluted and confusing. Trust and estate law suffers from this 
phenomenon.  
A will expresses a decedent’s desired restraints for disposition of her 
accumulated property at death.1 A decedent’s control over future 
generations as exercised through written intent is often referred to as the 
“dead hand” of the past.2 As one author notes, “Fundamentally, when the 
body flatlines, a person’s iron grip on ‘assets,’ all rights of ownership, all 
powers and authority supported by custom and law, dissolve, turn limp and 
flaccid; and the wealth, no matter how great, slips out of the person’s 
hands.”3 Wills, though simple to create, can have great impact. They can 
include directions for relatively immediate or eventual disposition of 
property, instructions for the care of minor children, and even burial 
requests. A will is the last gasp of a dying person trying to control the 
acquired things of life.  
A trust can substitute for a will but is more involved. At its core, it is a 
mechanism of preserving wealth for the benefit of another, monitored by a 
trustee.4 The Restatement of Trusts gives a more formal definition:  
[A] fiduciary relationship . . . arising from a manifestation of 
intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person 
                                                                                                                 
 1. JOAN M. BURDA, ESTATE PLANNING FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES 52 (2d ed. 2012). 
 2. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
INHERITANCE LAW 4 (2009).  
 3. Id. at 3. 
 4. Id. at 101. 
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who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the 
benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of 
whom is not the sole trustee.5 
While a trust can function in much the same way as a will, modifiable until 
the settlor dies and the terms become final, it can also transfer wealth 
during life.6  
Wills, trusts, and estate principles stem from English law.7 The roots of 
trusts stretch hundreds of years into the past.8 Ownership of property was at 
the heart of the English system of wealth, and the amount of land under a 
person’s control was the yardstick against which wealth was measured.9 
Taxes were assessed against a person’s property at death.10 In a time-
honored tradition that continues to this day, wily medieval landowners (and 
their accountants and lawyers) sought ways to avoid paying taxes whenever 
possible.11 Trusts became their tool of evasion.12  
For example, if Duke Humphrey contemplated his death and worried 
about the effects of taxes on his estate, he might seek the advice of his 
attorney, Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith would suggest that Duke Humphrey convey 
his property to his (hopefully trustworthy) friend Atkinson and Atkinson’s 
heirs “for the use of” the Duke’s son, Boswell, and Boswell’s heirs. While 
the Duke was still alive, he could use the property as he saw fit. Upon his 
death, his friend Atkinson would take the legal title, meaning that Atkinson 
would be listed as the owner of the land.13 Boswell would hold the 
equitable title, meaning that Boswell would have the right to the fruits and 
proceeds of the land, unlike Atkinson.14 This legal trickery essentially gave 
an estate more than one living owner at a time. When one owner passed on, 
                                                                                                                 
 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003). 
 6. WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, INSIDE WILLS AND TRUSTS: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 162 
(2012). 
 7. JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 38-
39 (3d ed. 1989). 
 8. RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY? PROPERTY AND THE DEAD HAND 3-4 
(2007). 
 9. David A. Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a 
Shared History – Part I: The Shared History, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 143, 171 (1999). 
 10. LAPIANA, supra note 6, at 175. 
 11. Id. at 175-76. 
 12. Id.; see also EDWIN MCINNIS, TRUST FUNCTIONS AND SERVICES 11 (1971).  
 13. LAPIANA, supra note 6, at 175-76.  
 14. It is important to note that “for the use of” only applied to real property that a 
conveyor actually owned. Life estates or leases, for example, were not eligible to be 
conveyed via this mechanism. MCINNIS, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
618 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:615 
 
 
the surviving owner would deed it to another person. The property would 
never completely pass at death because there would always be at least one 
owner alive. This would avoid any taxes that were triggered when a death 
resulted in a land transfer. 
Understandably, such conveyances “for the use of” another became very 
popular in medieval England, so “by the time of Henry V (1413-1422) they 
were the rule rather than the exception in landholding.”15 This trend 
continued, and “[b]y the sixteenth century the use was a highly-developed 
device and vast quantities of English land were held to uses.”16 The removal 
of vast tracts of land from the taxation scheme certainly would have been 
challenging for any treasury. 
Enter King Henry VIII. Henry VIII liked to have money to fill his 
coffers, as kings are wont to do, so deprivation of a large portion of his tax 
base was a problem.17 At his urging, the English Parliament reluctantly 
passed the Statute of Uses in 1535.18 After its passage, the Statute still 
permitted transferring land “to Atkinson and his heirs for the use of Boswell 
and his heirs,” but mandated that whoever held the “use” (the equitable 
title) also held the legal title.19 By requiring a single landowner to receive 
both titles, the land once again fully transferred at death. This result was 
very bad news for Duke Humphrey, his friend Atkinson, and the Duke’s 
son Boswell. Boswell was once again required to pay taxes. Henry VIII 
undoubtedly was pleased—after all, he had a succession of wives to support 
and a country to run.20  
A few critical exceptions to the Statute of Use’s applicability gave rise to 
the modern trust.21 Like the uses of old, “[i]n the modern trust, the trustee 
takes the legal title but must hold it for the benefit (use) of the beneficiary, 
who thus has equitable title.”22 Hence, a fiduciary relationship exists, 
meaning a trustee has a duty to act in the best interest of the one who is 
benefiting from the trust.23   
                                                                                                                 
 15. GEORGE T. BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 2 (3d ed. 2008). 
 16. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 71. 
 17. LAPIANA, supra note 6, at 175. 
 18. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 72.  
 19. Thomas, supra note 9, at 182. 
 20. See generally 2 WINSTON CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING 
PEOPLES 27-84 (1956). 
 21. 2 EDWARD F. KOREN ET AL., ESTATE TAX AND PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING § 
19.2 (2012). 
 22. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 73. 
 23. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 15, at §§ 1-2; TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 4-5 
(2011).  
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Trusts are used for many purposes. For example, the property or money 
held in a trust reduces an estate’s assets, decreasing the amount of tax 
levied on an estate at a trustor’s death.24 Trusts are generally not a matter of 
public record, so including property in an irrevocable trust helps to “avoid 
the expense, delay, claims, and publicity of probate.”25 By avoiding the 
probate process, a trust may not be subjected to potentially unfavorable 
judicial interpretation.26 Trusts also can benefit family members who are 
unable to take care of themselves.27 These family members could include 
minors, people with debilitating disabilities, or family members that tend to 
be inept at managing their own money.  
Issues often arise with trusts because the person creating the trust can 
only account for possibilities that she imagines. Situations involving money 
or relationships may change over time, but irrevocable trusts are not 
intended to be flexible. Instead, they are drafted to express and enforce the 
desires of the person who grants the trust and fills it with assets.28 The 
creator of an irrevocable trust intends the trust to be the means of carrying 
out his future wishes after exercising direct control becomes impossible.29  
B. Introduction to Trust Decanting 
“Trust decanting” deliberately evokes the method of decanting wine. 
After a fine wine sits and ages, impurities develop within the bottle.30 When 
wine is decanted, the old wine is transferred into a new container, thereby 
removing sediment and oxygenating the wine to improve its clarity and 
taste.31 
The concepts of decanting wine apply to decanting trusts. A trust 
decanting statute acts as a filter that removes the old, unfavorable terms.32 
                                                                                                                 
 24. KOREN ET AL., supra note 21, §§ 19.54, 19.56.  
 25. Id. § 19.55; see also A. James Casner, Estate Planning-Avoidance of Probate, 60 
COLUM. L. REV. 108, 123 (1960). 
 26. KOREN ET AL., supra note 21, § 19.55.  
 27. Id. §§ 19.17, 19.55. 
 28. Julia C. Walker, Law Summary, Get Your Dead Hands Off Me: Beneficiaries’ Right 
to Terminate or Modify a Trust Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 443, 443-45 
(2002). 
 29. Id. at 444. 
 30. Eric Asimov, Middle Ground in Decanting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at D6, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/dining/decanting-the-flavor-options.html. 
 31. Joseph Nase, Proper Transference Makes Wine Taste Better. So Pour It Out!, N.Y. 
MAG., http://nymag.com/restaurants/articles/wine/essentials/decanting.htm (last visited Oct. 
31, 2013).  
 32. Anne Marie Levin & Todd A. Flubacher, Putting Decanting to Work to Give Breath 
to Trust Purpose, ESTATE PLANNING, Jan. 2011, at 3, 3. 
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The assets of the original trust are transferred to a new trust, leaving the 
detrimental terms behind as sediment and breathing new life into the trust’s 
purpose.33  
Trusts implicated in trust decanting are either initially irrevocable trusts 
or revocable trusts that become irrevocable upon the death of the trustor.34 
An irrevocable trust has “some period of time [in which] no individual has 
the authority to terminate [it].”35 By contrast, a revocable trust can be 
cancelled.36 Testamentary trusts are revocable during a trustor’s life, 
utilizing “pour-over wills” to transfer assets after the trustor’s death.37 Once 
the trustor dies, the created trust is irrevocable.38 
Many problems can arise over time with trusts. Issues tend to fall into 
three general categories: (1) problems with the trust itself, whether the 
actual trust document or the assets held within the trust; (2) problems with 
the trustee; and (3) problems with the beneficiaries. 
Problems with the trust document include drafting errors and 
ambiguities.39 Asset issues include trusts with terms that impede the 
generosity of the grantor. For example, a trust may be locked into an 
unfavorable situs, resulting in higher taxes than otherwise could be obtained 
in jurisdictions that reduce or eliminate taxes.40 Trusts with investment 
limitations do not allow trustees to diversify, resulting in a lack of 
flexibility that hinders asset maximization.41 Decanting could extend a 
trust’s expiration date42 or allow perpetual trusts if permitted by a state’s 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Thomas E. Simmons, Decanting and Its Alternatives: Remodeling and 
Revamping Irrevocable Trusts, 55 S.D. L. REV. 253, 254 (2010) (“[D]ecanting has also been 
called the ‘ultimate’ in trust amendment powers for otherwise irrevocable trusts.”). 
 35. GEORGE M. TURNER, IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS 19 (1985). 
 36. LAPIANA, supra note 6, at 248. 
 37. KOREN ET AL., supra note 21, § 18:44. 
 38. Limb v. Aldrige, 1999 OK CIV APP 31, ¶ 4, 978 P.2d 365, 367. 
 39. William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani Bennett Mellen, Trust Decanting: An Overview and 
Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 14 
(2010). 
 40. William R. Burford, Practical Prescriptions for Fixing a Broken Trust, ESTATE 
PLANNING, Sept. 2009, at 9, 12 (2009); see also Culp & Mellen, supra note 39, at 15. 
 41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (2003); Christopher P. Cline, The 
Uniform Prudent Investor and Principal and Income Acts: Changing the Trust Landscape, 
42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611, 636-37 (2008); Trent S. Kiziah, The Trustee’s Duty to 
Diversify: An Examination of the Developing Case Law, 36 ACTEC L.J. 357, 358 (2010).  
 42. Diana S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Tax Effects of Decanting - Obtaining 
and Preserving the Benefits, 111 J. TAX’N 288, 291 (2009).  
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rule against perpetuities,43 both of which would afford the trustee more 
flexibility to maximize trust assets on behalf of the beneficiaries. 
Next, trustee issues include inadequate compensation, too many 
restrictions on trustee powers, or limitations on who can act as a trustee.44 
For example, a trustee may not be equipped to handle the investments of the 
trust asset, so a modification may allow for the trustee to appoint an 
adequate financial manager.45 
Finally, a change in a beneficiary’s life may provide the impetus for trust 
alterations. One example is the need for a spendthrift clause that may not be 
evident at the trust’s creation.46 Not all beneficiaries use trust assets wisely, 
so a spendthrift clause prevents creditors from claiming a beneficiary’s 
interest in the trust47 and also prevents a beneficiary from transferring his 
interests to others.48 For example, Grandpa sets up a trust with the intent of 
benefiting his daughter and her child. However, his daughter potentially 
could use up the trust principal, leaving nothing for the child or exposing 
the trust assets to outsiders’ claims. The addition of a spendthrift clause to a 
trust would prevent this occurrence. If a person’s living situation changes, 
such as becoming disabled, an alteration of the trust terms could assist the 
beneficiary.49 
Trust decanting holds obvious appeal for both trustees and beneficiaries. 
However, problems exist, including those involving (1) trustee 
responsibilities, (2) trustor intent, and (3) lack of oversight.  
Decanting statutes, by their nature, grant trustees a large amount of 
discretion. This potentially could generate conflict between much-desired 
“efficiency and flexibility in trust administration” and “fulfilling the 
settlor’s intent.”50 Trusts can replace or expand the terms of a will, despite 
the public policy of allowing a person the largely uninhibited right to 
                                                                                                                 
 43. William R. Culp, Jr. & Briani L. Bennett, Use of Trust Decanting to Extend the 
Term of Irrevocable Trusts, ESTATE PLANNING, June 2010, at 3, 3. 
 44. Jeffrey A. Kern & H. Allan Shore, So You Left Your Trust at Home When You 
Moved to Florida, FLA. B. J., May 2009, at 56, 56. 
 45. Culp & Mellen, supra note 39, at 14.  
 46. Levin & Flubacher, supra note 32, at 9. 
 47. Richard Ploss, Reviewing the Client’s Assets and Objectives in Developing an 
Estate Planning Strategy, in BEST PRACTICES FOR STRUCTURING TRUSTS AND ESTATES: 
LEADING LAWYERS ON DRAFTING A FLEXIBLE PLAN, PROTECTING THE CLIENT’S ASSETS, AND 
LEVERAGING TAX STRATEGIES 4 (2011), available at 2011 WL 6431200.  
 48. Levin & Flubacher, supra note 32, at 9. 
 49. Culp & Mellen, supra note 39, at 14.  
 50. Joseph T. La Ferlita, New York’s Newly Amended Decanting Statute Typifies Trend 
Toward Greater Flexibility, PROBATE & PROPERTY, July/Aug. 2012, at 34, 35. 
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dispose of assets gained during life in the way she chooses.51 Imagine if 
Grandpa loves the state of Michigan and desires that his progeny remain 
connected with the state. If his will established a trust requiring his 
beneficiaries to reside in Michigan at least six months of the year in order to 
receive the trust proceeds, the current law would allow Grandpa to know 
that his wishes will be carried out. Trust decanting would remove this 
certainty.   
Additionally, allowing decanting could directly contradict the trustor’s 
desires. Just as a trust could be decanted to implement a spendthrift 
provision, decanting could also remove a spendthrift provision put in place 
by the original trustor. A decanting provision could even impact prior 
agreements made by the trustor outside of the trust context. For example, by 
changing beneficiaries, decanting could alter trust provisions in a way that 
materially modifies a divorce agreement or decree.  
Another problem is that decanting may be accomplished without court 
approval. This leaves no one to oversee the trustee. A trustee possesses a 
fiduciary duty towards the beneficiaries of trusts that he administers, but he 
may not always adequately fulfill that duty.52 While a trustee may 
eventually have to answer for his actions in a court of law, irreversible 
damage already may have occurred.53 For example, a beneficiary may lack 
the capacity to know that a trustee’s changes might not serve the 
beneficiary’s best interests. Decanting could also allow a trustee to change 
the amount of his personal compensation,54 resulting in a clear conflict of 
interest between administering the trust and his own financial gain. Despite 
the competing objectives of trust law, decanting is gaining ground.  
III. Fifty-State Survey 
The pace of decanting started slowly. New York is the clear innovator in 
the field, enacting the first decanting provision in 1992.55 Six years later, 
Alaska became the second state to pass a decanting statute, followed by 
                                                                                                                 
 51. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
 52. “A trustee is a fiduciary of the highest order in whom the hope and confidence of 
the settlor are placed with the expectation that the trustee will exercise the obligations of the 
office for the exclusive benefit of the [beneficiary]. To the [beneficiary] a trustee always 
owes uberrima fides (utmost good faith).” State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Clausing, 2009 
OK 74, ¶ 13, 224 P.3d 1268, 1274-75. 
 53. See, e.g., Mires v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (W.D. Okla. 2005), aff’d, 
466 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2006); Brown v. Batt, 1981 OK CIV APP 39, 631 P.2d 1346. 
 54. Levin & Flubacher, supra note 32, at 8. 
 55. Culp & Bennett, supra note 43, at 4. 
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another lull until Delaware’s 2003 enactment of its statute.56 Then a torrent 
of legislative decanting provisions began, with eight states adding statutory 
decanting provisions in the first decade of the twenty-first century.57 Seven 
states enacted decanting provisions in 2011 and 2012 alone.58 Last year, 
South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming joined this trend, passing decanting 
statutes that took effect in 2013 or early 2014.59 
As of January 2014, twenty-one states have passed decanting provisions, 
including Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Virginia, and Wyoming.60 Since these enactments, several of these states 
have amended their decanting statutes, some within a relatively short time 
after passing the initial decanting statute.61  
The enactment trend, although increasing, is not universal. Not every 
state that has considered allowing trust decanting has followed through with 
enactment. Colorado considered a decanting statute, but its provision may 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Simmons, supra note 34, at 272. 
 57. Tennessee (2004), Florida (2007), South Dakota (2007), New Hampshire (2008), 
Arizona (2009), Nevada (2009), North Carolina (2009) and Indiana (2010). Id. at 272-73.  
 58. Missouri and Ohio in 2011; Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Rhode Island, and 
Virginia in 2012. See infra note 60.  
 59. S.B. 0143, 120th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2013-2014), available at http:// 
www.scstatehouse.gov/sess120_2013-2014/prever/143_20130516.htm; H.B. 2913, 83rd 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/83R/billtext/ 
pdf/HB02913F.pdf; H.B. 139, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013), available at http://legis 
web.state.wy.us/2013/Enroll/HB0139.pdf.  
 60. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819 (2012); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 736.04117 (2012); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/16.4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36 (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
386.175 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 556.115a, 700.7103, 700.7820a 
(2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419 (West Supp. 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556 
(West Supp. 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); N.Y. 
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (Consol. Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-8-
816.1 (West Supp. 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18 (LexisNexis 2013); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 18-4-31 (Supp. 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-816A (West Supp. 2014); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-2-15 to 55-2-21 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816 (2007); TEX. 
TRUST CODE §§ 112.071-112.089 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1 (2012); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 4-10-816(a)(xxviii) (2013). For a helpful chart, see M. Patricia Culler, State 
Decanting Statutes Passed or Proposed, ACTEC.ORG (July 1, 2013), http://www.actec.org/ 
public/Documents/Studies/Culler_Decanting_Statutes_ 07_01_2013.pdf. 
 61. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157 (amended in 2008 and 2013), ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-10819 (amended in 2011), N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (amended 
in 2001 and 2011).  
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be permanently stalled due to concerns over potential abuses of power, 
especially in divorce situations.62 
The popularity of decanting statutes continues to grow. With the current 
fervor for trust decanting statutes, evidenced by the ever-increasing number 
of enactments and the record-setting pace of decanting provisions passed 
within the last several years, this trend will likely continue and possibly 
even accelerate.  
Despite acting contemporaneously with other states, each state’s 
statutory language differs slightly. These language variances impart 
potentially immeasurable consequences for presently existing as well as 
future trusts. Legislatures must be aware of ambiguities in drafting statutory 
provisions and the rippling aftereffects caused by unclear language. When 
courts are left to interpret vague statutes without legislative guidance, it 
increases the uncertainty of practitioners and trust creators who are intent 
on drafting documents that must remain clear for future generations. 
Moreover, trust decanting is relatively new, so limited precedent exists. 
Reviewing the plain meanings of current decanting provisions in place 
across the states reveals the variety of reasonable interpretations that can be 
drawn from statutory language. 
A. Trustor Intent  
Trust decanting statutes can still protect trustor intent. Many states with 
decanting provisions begin their decanting statutes with a phrase similar to 
“unless the terms of the instrument [or trust] expressly provide 
otherwise . . . .”63 Under a plain reading, this allows future trustors to create 
trusts that are specifically exempt from the power of decanting statutes. 
This provides flexibility for future trustors but does not aid a trustor whose 
written desires have already vested through death or the irrevocable nature 
of a trust. Past trustors would have had no reason to contemplate that future 
generations would be able to interfere with their final wishes.  
Almost all the states with decanting provisions require a trust instrument 
to “expressly” list the objection to decanting or distribution.64 This favors a 
presumption that decanting is acceptable unless a clear contrary intent 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See infra Part IV.C; see also Colo. Bar Ass’n Trust & Estate Section Statutory 
Revisions Comm., Minutes (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.cobar.org/repository/ 
Inside_Bar/TrustEstate/SRC/SRC%20October%20Minutes.pdf; Richard I. Zuber, Greetings 
from the Chair, FAM. L. NEWSL. (Colo. Bar Ass’n, Denver, Colo.), May 2011, available at 
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/192/subID/27005/FAMILY//. 
 63. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157(a); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419.1. 
 64. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18(A). 
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exists. Interestingly, Nevada is the only state that does not require a trust to 
“expressly provide otherwise.”65 Rather, the language of the statute just 
says “provide otherwise.”66 This opens the door for courts to infer the 
original grantor’s favor or disfavor of trust decanting from the existing trust 
terms, even though the concept of trust decanting would have been 
unanticipated at the time of the original granting. 
Even more troublesome are the decanting statutes passed by New York 
and North Carolina, which contain no provision for the original grantor to 
“provide otherwise,” whether expressly or not.67 The lack of this language 
suggests that the trust laws in these states no longer allow a trustor to have 
true discretion in the settlement of her assets at death. Virginia’s newly 
enacted statute goes even farther by allowing a trustee to exercise decanting 
power “regardless of whether the original trust . . . prohibits amendment or 
revocation of the original trust.”68 Confusingly, the Virginia statute then 
goes on to suggest language for the trust document that would show a 
trustor’s intent to prohibit decanting.69 However, this language benefits 
future trustors, but countermands the intent of past trustors. These statutes 
show a society that is moving away from the traditional guardianship of a 
trustor’s expressed wishes to a more modern, dead-hand-rejecting culture 
that favors the living, breathing client across the table. 
B. Trustee Duties and Authority  
A trustee’s duty is to administer a trust faithfully in the best interests of 
the beneficiaries, but a question arises as to when, or even if, a trust should 
be decanted when those duties conflict. Without further guidance, this issue 
could rapidly develop into a minefield, even for a conscientious trustee. A 
trustee might have reasons to avoid changing the terms of an irrevocable 
trust, even when such an avoidance might expose the trust to short-term 
losses. Responding to this concern, several state laws dictate that decanting 
is a function of trustee discretion.70  
Missouri’s statute reassured trustees of how decanting fits within the 
fiduciary framework by providing that no affirmative duty to decant exists 
                                                                                                                 
 65. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556(1). 
 66. Id. 
 67. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6 (Consol. Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 36C-8-816.1 (West Supp. 2012). 
 68. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1(E)(4) (2012). 
 69. Id. § 64.2-778.1(K). 
 70. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157(a) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-8-816.1(b) 
(West 2007). 
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within a trustee’s fiduciary obligations.71 This means that a trustee who 
chooses not to decant, even if decanting would financially benefit the trust 
or its beneficiaries, does not violate his fiduciary duties. Other states also 
employ this concept.72 South Dakota, in contrast, specifically requires that 
decanting be “necessary or desirable.”73 Its provision stands out among the 
states by providing flexibility in the form of decanting, while putting a 
specific check on a trustee acting within his fiduciary capacity to submit 
that decanting would be “necessary and desirable.” This safeguards trustees 
and beneficiaries in an area of uncertain parameters. 
Court approval also may be desirable for oversight of trusts and trustee 
actions. Some states have enacted decanting provisions that do not require 
trustees to obtain court approval before invading trust principal.74 However, 
many of the remaining states are silent on the issue of court approval.75 
Nevada is somewhat unusual in that a trustee “may petition a court for 
approval.”76 This language does not indicate a clear duty to provide notice 
or gain court approval before taking action, instead leaving the trustee to 
wonder what his fiduciary duty entails.  
The downside of requiring court oversight is its restraint on a trustee’s 
independent ability to decide what actions would most benefit the trust 
corpus and the beneficiaries it supports. With the ever-increasing volume of 
cases in the legal system, especially in times of economic turmoil and 
limited resources, requiring court approval for trustee changes could be 
seen as both an unnecessary burden on the courts and a hindrance to trust 
management.  
Exercising powers received under decanting statutes without court 
oversight undoubtedly grants trustees an enormous amount of control. 
Perhaps recognizing this, decanting statutes indicate what kind of authority 
the trustee must have under the terms of the testamentary instrument or trust 
in order to decant the assets. The amount of authority varies. Some statutes 
just say “a trustee who has authority.”77 Other statutes specifically indicate 
the trustee must have discretionary authority.78 Yet another set of statutes 
                                                                                                                 
 71. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419.4-.5 (West Supp. 2012). 
 72. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175(8) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 73. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15 (2012). 
 74. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-8-816.1(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1(B). 
 75. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 76. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556(5) (West Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). 
 77. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157(a) (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-
816(b)(27)(A) (2007). 
 78. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819(A) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 
3528(a) (2007). 
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maintain that a trustee must have “absolute power” or “unlimited 
discretion” to decant.79  
Although states have described trustee authority using different terms, 
they generally do not outline what these terms mean. Ohio, however, chose 
to define a trustee’s “absolute power” as including “any power to make 
distributions of principal that is not limited by reasonably definite standards 
or ascertainable standards, whether or not the word ‘absolute’ is used in the 
trust instrument.”80 New York uses “unlimited discretion” and has defined 
this term as “the unlimited right to distribute principal that is not modified 
in any manner.”81 This echoes Ohio’s definition of “absolute power” in that 
both statutes reflect the idea that trustee power extends as far as the limits 
of fiduciary duty will stretch.  
A vision of trustee authority need not remain static. New York, the 
pioneer of decanting, originally included language that required trustees to 
use reasonable care, diligence, and prudence in choosing to decant,82 but 
only trustees who were granted absolute discretion by the trustor had the 
authority to decant.83 However, with subsequent revisions, “decanting in 
New York became fully discretionary for trustees of certain trusts . . . 
although the statute preserved the ability of a trustee to seek either the 
beneficiaries’ consent or a court’s permission if the trustee saw fit to do 
so.”84 By decreasing the authority required from “absolute” to 
“discretionary” for certain trusts, the statute’s tight controls slackened, 
rendering it “among the nation’s most progressive decanting statutes.”85 
Because of the lowered discretionary requirement and removal of the filing 
requirement with the court, trustees with greater authority benefit from the 
                                                                                                                 
 79. E.g., IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36(a) (2011) (“absolute power”); N.Y. EST. POWERS & 
TRUSTS § 10-6.6(b) (Consol. Supp. 2012) (“unlimited discretion”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
5808.18(A)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (“absolute power”). 
 80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18(A)(2)(a). Illinois and Rhode Island, two of the 
more recent states to pass decanting statutes, have also chosen to define “absolute” trustee 
power. See 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) and R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 18-4-31(a)(2) (Supp. 2012). 
 81. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(s)(9). 
 82. Joseph T. La Ferlita, New York’s Newly Amended Decanting Statute, TR. & EST. L. 
SEC. NEWSL. (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Albany, N.Y.), Winter 2011, at 10, 11, available at 
http://www.farrellfritz.com/wp-content/uploads/article-495.pdf. 
 83. La Ferlita, supra note 50, at 35.  
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
 85. Id. at 34. 
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increased flexibility of the amended statute.86 As always, trustees retain the 
duty to act in the best interest of beneficiaries regardless of the exact 
statutory depiction of duties, but these states have wisely taken steps to 
define their vision of trustee power. 
C. Beneficiary Protections and Concerns  
Beneficiary protection provisions should be carefully contemplated in 
any statutory decanting language. Provisions to consider include limitations 
on beneficiary changes, notice of alterations to trust terms or investments, 
method of recording, and review of financial implications. Because of 
trustees’ vast power in states that allow decanting, statutes should provide 
clear structure and guidelines, not indistinct and undefined language, to 
safeguard asset security. 
As an initial matter, states must decide who is entitled to benefit from 
decanting. Because of the potential to marginalize or completely exclude 
beneficiaries from a decanted trust, a change of beneficiary provision has 
the potential to be the most explosive and contentious issue in any trust 
fight. Language of statutory provisions varies widely among the states that 
have enacted decanting laws, and ambiguity abounds. 
Some states, like Indiana, require the beneficiaries of the first trust to be 
the same beneficiaries under the decanted (second) trust.87 This has the 
benefit of clarity. However, with clarity, some flexibility could be lost. 
Rigidity might be in keeping with public policy or it could be the element 
that hinders a trust from fully benefiting those it is designed to help.88  
Other states’ statutes indicate that new beneficiaries cannot be added but 
do not explicitly state that the beneficiaries of the new trust must include 
the same beneficiaries as the old trust. For example, North Carolina only 
allows beneficiaries of the original trust to be beneficiaries of the second 
trust, but does not indicate that “all” or the “same” beneficiaries must be 
provided for.89 Nevada’s statute specifies that the decanted trust cannot 
include a beneficiary that was not named in the first trust, but on its face, 
the statutory language says nothing about using decanting to remove an 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Warren R. Gleicher, Challenges for the New York Trusts and Estates Attorney, in 
STRATEGIES FOR TRUSTS AND ESTATES IN NEW YORK: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND NAVIGATING THE ESTATE PLANNING PROCESS IN NEW YORK 1, 2 
(Michaela Falls ed., 2012), available at 2012 WL 191162. 
 87. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-36(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011). 
 88. See infra Part IV.C (analysis of social considerations and family structure). 
 89. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-8-816.1(c)(1) (West Supp. 2012). 
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original beneficiary.90 However, Nevada requires trustees to receive consent 
in writing when a beneficiary would not be receiving the same property 
under the decanted trust as she had under the original trust.91 This provision 
acts as a check against abuse by a trustee. 
Missouri employs curious language for its beneficiary provisions.92 Its 
statute provides that the decanted trust “may have as beneficiaries only one 
or more of those beneficiaries of the first trust” or “one or more” 
beneficiaries that may have received a distribution from the trust in the 
future.93 A plain reading implies that the legislature intended for decanting 
to be able to alter the number and specific recipients of trust proceeds, 
despite the language employed by the trustor. 
Even small words can have a big impact. Arizona requires the decanted 
trust terms to benefit “a” beneficiary of the original trust.94 Without 
specifying that the decanted trust needs to benefit “all” beneficiaries of the 
original trust, a trustee could decant in a way that benefits some 
beneficiaries but disadvantages others. Perhaps having this risk in mind, 
North Carolina’s decanting statute does not allow a trustee who is also a 
beneficiary to decant a trust.95 Missouri’s statute employs similar language 
to deny a decision of this magnitude to someone who is both a trustee and 
beneficiary.96 These provisions could act as a check on trustee power and 
provide safeguards for listed beneficiaries. 
Delaware has equally problematic language. Its statute requires trustees 
to decant for the benefit of “beneficiaries who are proper objects of the 
exercise of power.”97 Tennessee’s statute echoes the language of “proper 
objects.”98 While case law may be able to clarify who qualifies as a “proper 
object” of a trust, the statutory language is almost guaranteed to introduce 
confusion and lack of clarity into trust formation and administration. 
New York’s statutory provision attempts a balanced approach. The 2011 
amendments allow a trustee with discretionary authority, as opposed to 
absolute authority, to decant to the same beneficiaries of the original trust.99 
                                                                                                                 
 90. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556.2(a) (West Supp. 2012). 
 91. Id. § 163.556.2(e). 
 92. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419.2(1) (West Supp. 2012). South Dakota employs 
similar language. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15(1) (2012). 
 93. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419.2(1). 
 94. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819(A) (2012). 
 95. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-8-816.1(d) (West Supp. 2012). 
 96. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419.2(2)(a). 
 97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528(a)(1) (2007). 
 98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816(b)(27)(A)(ii) (2007). 
 99. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(c) (Consol. Supp. 2012). 
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A New York trustee with unlimited discretion, however, “can decant the 
original trust to a new trust which benefits only some of the beneficiaries of 
the original trust.”100 Because of the sensitivity of beneficiary allotment, the 
hybrid language is a nuanced accommodation that recognizes the differing 
levels of authority held by a trustee. 
Beyond deciding who will be a beneficiary, almost all decanting statutes 
contain a notice provision that requires the trustee to notify specific 
beneficiaries prior to the effective date of decanting.101 The required time 
period varies between twenty days, as in South Dakota102; thirty days, as in 
New Hampshire and Ohio103; and sixty days in many of the other states.104 
Some states, such as Alaska and Arizona, have declined to include a 
specific notice provision in decanting statutes.105 Nevada only indicates that 
a trustee “may give notice” prior to decanting but does not couch this as a 
requirement or include a timeframe for guidance in its decanting statute.106  
Tracking modifications is of vital importance for practitioners and 
beneficiaries. Some states provide a method for recording changes in trusts 
when decanting occurs. A common provision requires changes to be in 
writing, signed by the trustee, and filed with the records from the original 
trust.107 Other states do not specifically provide for a method of 
recording.108 When no process is specified, it is reasonable to infer that 
whatever method is mandated for the original recording of a trust also could 
be used for any amendments. However, beneficiaries receive better 
protection when states indicate a standard method for keeping track of 
modifications.  
As a practical matter, beneficiaries should be concerned with the effect 
of decanting on income earned from a trust as well as the tax implications 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Gleicher, supra note 87, at 2 (emphasis added); see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & 
TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(b).  
 101. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-8-816.1(f)(2) (West Supp. 2012). 
 102. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-18 (2012). 
 103. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-418(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 5808.18(F) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012). 
 104. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 18-4-31(d) (West Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-
778.1(G) (2012).  
 105. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10819 (2012). 
 106. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556.5 (West Supp. 2012).  
 107. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528(b) (2007); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/16.4(r) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 386.175(7)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2012).  
 108. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.157; MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-419 (West Supp. 
2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-2-15 (2012). 
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that follow. One limitation that states consistently agree upon is for the 
beneficiaries’ income to remain the same after decanting.109 Another 
common provision only allows decanting if changing the original trust will 
not alter tax implications or introduce adverse tax consequences for 
beneficiaries.110 For example, Arizona prohibits decanting if such an action 
would alter the income or payment received from the trust or cause an 
adverse tax effect.111 Most of the other states use similar language.112  
Other states, such as Tennessee, only require the income from the 
decanted trust to be the same as a beneficiary received from the original 
trust, without addressing the tax implications.113 New York also protects 
beneficiaries, but recognizes that tax implications may not be controllable 
as a static element during decanting.114 Consequently, the New York statute 
requires that a trustee “consider” the tax implications, but its plain language 
does not restrict decanting to situations where the taxes on the trust or its 
beneficiaries remain unchanged after decanting.115  
Trust decanting is intended to maximize the welfare of beneficiaries who 
are supported by a trust’s assets.116 Mindful of this goal, careful statutory 
language coupled with considerations of desired social policy allow 
decanting to be utilized in a beneficial manner.   
IV. Analysis: An Argument for Decanting 
A. Oklahoma’s Current Trust Statute 
In Oklahoma, trusts are created through written documents or by 
operation of law.117 Formation of a trust also can be presumed based on the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 736.04117(1)(a)(1)-(2) (2011); IND. CODE § 30-4-3-36(a)(2)-
(3) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.556.2(b)-(c); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-
418(b)(2)-(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(n)(1), 
(o) (Consol. Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-8-816.1(c)(3)-(4) (West Supp. 
2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-778.1(C)(4)-(5) (2012). 
 110. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5808.18(C)(2)-(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 18-4-31(a)(3) (West Supp. 2012). 
 111. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10819(A)(1)-(2), (5) (2012). 
 112. See, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16.4(n)(1), (p); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
386.175(4)(c)-(d) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-816(b)(27) (2007); see also ALASKA STAT. § 
13.36.157(a)(1) (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3528(a)(3) (2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
456.4-419.2(5). 
 114. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(o) (Consol. Supp. 2013). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See KOREN ET AL., supra note 21, § 1:11. 
 117. 60 OKLA. STAT. §§ 136, 175.6 (2011). 
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actions of two parties.118 Assets held in trust can consist of real or personal 
property.119 Trustors can amend revocable trusts with the written consent of 
all its vested or contingent beneficiaries.120 If the trustor reserves power of 
amendment, she can “add duties . . . privileges, or powers to those imposed 
or granted by [statute].”121 The amending provision does not apply to 
irrevocable trusts.122 It is unclear if the trustor’s current statutory power of 
amendment would stretch to the extent necessary to allow trust decanting 
without statutory support.  
Broadly speaking, an Oklahoma trustee can “do any lawful act in relation 
to the trust property which any individual owning the same absolutely 
might do.”123 The power of the trustee is not personal but rather is a 
function of his fiduciary position.124 The Oklahoma Statutes grant broad 
powers to a trustee “[i]n the absence of contrary or limiting provisions,”125 
but prohibit a trustee from borrowing funds or lending monies to affiliates 
using trust assets.126 Trustee power includes the ability “to carry on and 
conduct any lawful business designated in the instrument of trust”127 and to 
appoint a different trustee to oversee any portion of a trust that is in a 
different situs.128 Oklahoma law also dictates the property in which a trustee 
may invest129 and allows a trustee to retain any property originally received 
as well as any substitution for the original property.130 Specific remedies are 
included for a trustee who breaches his fiduciary duty and acts in bad faith 
towards trust beneficiaries.131  
When the trust has fulfilled its function, it terminates.132 In Oklahoma, 
expiration of a trust does not mean that remaining trust assets will 
automatically escheat to the state.133 Instead, the Oklahoma Statutes provide 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. § 137. 
 119. Id. § 175.2. 
 120. Id. § 175.41. 
 121. Id. § 175.21. 
 122. Id. § 175.41. 
 123. Id. § 171 (emphasis added).  
 124. Id. § 175.16. 
 125. Id. § 175.24. 
 126. Id. §§ 175.9, 175.11, 175.12. 
 127. Id. § 171.60; see also id. § 175.24. 
 128. Id. §§ 175.54, 175.55. 
 129. Id. § 161. 
 130. Id. § 163. 
 131. Id. § 175.57. 
 132. Id. § 175.49. 
 133. Id. § 175.42. 
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that at the failure or termination of a trust, the trustor may indicate to whom 
the remaining property will be transferred or devised.134 If a beneficiary 
predeceases the distribution of trust assets, the assets will go to the “lineal” 
descendants.135  
Oklahoma should consider any changes to its current trust law in light of 
the best interests of its citizens and its future goals for prosperity and 
stability. As such, analyzing the implications of trust decanting must 
include its impacts on wide-ranging concerns—the impact of the rule 
against perpetuities, societal implications, matters dealing with family 
structure, tax consequences, and broad economic impacts.  
B. Oklahoma’s Rule Against Perpetuities 
When considering trust formation, trustors must be aware of one 
particularly trying provision in Oklahoma law, the rule against perpetuities 
(RAP).136 The RAP is routinely cited as “the bane of all first-year law 
school students.”137 One professor wryly noted that it was “understandable 
why most lawyers shrink from the Rule against Perpetuities and try to pass 
it off as merely an exercise in erudition or lock it up securely like a skeleton 
in a closet.”138 It is important to remember that the RAP was designed to 
facilitate alienability of land because of the lack of frequent transference of 
land occurring in Henry VIII’s day.139 Therefore, if a conveyance of land 
could violate the RAP, it was considered void ab initio and the parties were 
able to start over with a new conveyance immediately.140  
The familiar language of the RAP is that “[n]o interest is good unless it 
must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being 
at the creation of the interest.”141 Put simply, the RAP is the rule against 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. § 175.56. The lineal descendants of a beneficiary are set forth in Oklahoma’s 
descent and distribution statute. 84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (2011). 
 136. Although some other states have abolished the RAP altogether or amended its 
provisions, Oklahoma retains the classic RAP formulation. See infra Part IV.B.4.  
 137. David M. Grant & Jeremy K. Cooper, Nevada Laws Provide Top Trust Situs, NEV. 
LAW. MAG., May 2010, at 20, 21, available at http://nvbar.org/articles/content/nevada-laws-
provide-top-trust-situs; see also Edward J. McCaffery et al., The Advantage of Creating Out-
of-State Trusts, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2005, at 19, 20, available at http://www.lacba.org/files/ 
lal/vol28no6/2178.pdf. 
 138. Olin J. Browder, Jr., Perpetuities in Oklahoma, 6 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1953). 
 139. See supra Part II.A; see also John William Mee, Jr., Comment, Estates in Land: The 
Rule Against Perpetuities in Oklahoma, 17 OKLA. L. REV. 438, 439 (1964). 
 140. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 83. 
 141. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
634 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:615 
 
 
remote vesting.142 The headaches begin when this simple sentence is broken 
down into its component parts. However, the potential for negative impacts 
means the RAP must be understood and accounted for when enacting a trust 
decanting statute.   
1. Future Interests  
Vested future interests do not trigger RAP provisions.143 When an 
interest is “vested,” there is a person who is (1) born, (2) ascertainable, and 
(3) not subject to a condition precedent.144 Imagine that Bruce wants to give 
his farm, Melody Acres, to his only son, Gordon. Gordon is in his mid-
twenties, unmarried, and a generally good son. Bruce writes a deed stating, 
“I, Bruce, owner in fee simple absolute, give Melody Acres to my son 
Gordon and his heirs in fee simple absolute.” Gordon is born, named, and 
ascertainable. Additionally, Bruce has not placed any conditions on the gift 
that Gordon must fulfill prior to inheriting the land. The same transfer 
works even if Bruce does not specifically name Gordon if the language 
conveyed the land “to my son.” As Bruce’s only son, Gordon is still 
ascertainable as the intended recipient of the land. This is a vested future 
interest.  
Although vested remainders do not trigger RAP provisions, three types 
of future interests do implicate the RAP: contingent remainders, executory 
interests, and vested remainders that are subject to open.145 These concepts 
are similar, but each provides a different gloss on a future conveyance.  
First, a contingent remainder is the opposite of a vested remainder. An 
interest is not vested—and therefore is contingent—when there is a person 
who is (1) not born, (2) not ascertainable, or (3) subject to a condition 
precedent.146 Imagine if Bruce wishes to leave Melody Acres to his son 
Gordon but also wants to encourage Gordon to have grandchildren. Bruce 
conveys Melody Acres to “my son Gordon’s firstborn child” and then dies 
before Gordon has a child. At this point, no qualified person exists to hold 
the interest that became available at Bruce’s death because no child has 
been born and therefore is not ascertainable. 
Second, an executory interest vests only upon the occurring or breaking 
of a condition.147 The occurrence or breach initiates an automatic transfer 
                                                                                                                 
 142. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 639 (1938). 
 143. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 15, § 213. 
 144. JOHN A. BORRON, JR., THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 165 (3d ed. 2013). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. § 221.  
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from the current holder of property to a third person.148 Imagine if Bruce, 
our owner of Melody Acres, wants to maintain his family’s ties to the land. 
Concerned about the possibility of his children leaving Page County, he 
transfers Melody Acres to his son Gordon “so long as none of my children 
or grandchildren ever step even one toe across the Page County line; and if 
any of my children or grandchildren ever step across, then Melody Acres 
goes to the Page County Courthouse preservation fund.” Because it is 
possible that Bruce’s children or grandchildren could step over the county 
line—even by just one toe!—this provision would violate the RAP.   
Third, a vested remainder subject to open involves a class of people who 
are all eligible to inherit, rather than just an individual.149 A few years have 
passed from the previous scenario. Gordon has met a nice girl named 
Claudia, settled down, and started a family. Bruce is pleased as punch and 
decides to convey Melody Acres “to all the children of my son Gordon.” 
Gordon and Claudia have two children at this point, but both of them are 
young enough to keep adding to the family. If Bruce were to die with this 
provision in place, the remainder would be vested because the children born 
of Gordon would meet the conditions set forth. However, the remainder 
interest would also be subject to open because Gordon and Claudia could 
keep having children who would also qualify to inherit under the terms of 
the conveyance. As with the previous two interests, this inheritance would 
be void under the RAP.    
2. A “Life in Being” 
A “life in being,” another piece of the RAP,150 means any person who 
was alive when an interest was created and gradually came to include those 
who were still in utero at the time of the creation of the interest.151 While 
common sense may suggest that a person with a chance of inheriting from 
an interest would be used as a measuring life, this is not the case. Rather, 
“[t]he measuring lives need not be mentioned in the instrument, need not be 
holders of previous estates, and need not be connected in any way with the 
property or the persons designated to take it.”152 This could be taken to 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. § 146. 
 150. “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years 
after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” GRAY, supra note 142, at 191. 
 151. CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 83. 
 152. Leach, supra note 143, at 641. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
636 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:615 
 
 
farcical lengths. Practically speaking, this length of time often has been 
fixed at ninety years.153  
3. RAP Time Frame 
The time period of the RAP begins to run when a conveyance is 
complete and the person making the conveyance is unable to change his 
mind, whether because of an irrevocable transfer or death.154 At that point, 
the interest is created and must vest in those who are to benefit from the 
conveyance within twenty-one years after the death of the last “life in 
being” who was alive at the time of the conveyance.155 The RAP will void a 
conveyance if the interest created through the formation of an irrevocable 
trust has not vested within a set time period after its creation. Imagine that 
Bruce gives Melody Acres to “Gordon for life” and then the remainder to 
“my grandchildren who reach the age of twenty after my death.” Depending 
on the circumstances, this conveyance might not violate the RAP because 
the remainder could vest within the perpetuities period. If, however, Bruce 
gives Melody Acres “to Gordon for life” and then the remainder to “my 
grandchildren who reach the age of twenty-five after my death,” this 
conveyance would be void because the remainder would not vest within the 
perpetuities timeframe of twenty-one years. 
4. Current Status of the RAP  
The RAP holds an overlooked position at the heart of ongoing debate 
over multi-generational wealth accumulation. In 1953, an esteemed 
professor wrote:  
The practitioner’s disdain for the seemingly unreasonable 
refinements of a perpetuities problem should not cloud the fact 
that this technical rule, together with other related rules, 
expresses a major and as yet unquestioned principle of public 
policy; that is, that persons shall not unreasonably withdraw their 
property from the channels of commerce.156 
The general population would have no reason to be aware that the RAP 
historically has been a stopgap measure preventing perpetual wealth 
                                                                                                                 
 153. For example, Florida’s perpetuities period was ninety years. FLA. STAT. § 
689.225(2)(a)(2) (2011) (subsequently lengthened to 360 years by section 689.225(2)(f)). 
 154. Leach, supra note 143, at 640. 
 155. There are numerous ways to measure the “last” life in being. See BOGERT ET AL., 
supra note 15, § 213. 
 156. Browder, supra note 139, at 1-2.  
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transfer and growing economic divide. But in this day and age, would a 
repeal of the RAP truly be a mechanism of “creating an American 
aristocracy?”157  
Because trust decanting could trigger the RAP, its provisions must be 
taken into account. The RAP remains significant in a slim majority of the 
states. One scholarly article counted twenty-one states that, for trust 
interests, had abolished the RAP at the end of 2005.158 Another article 
observed that “[r]ecent developments in modern trust law have seen two 
major trends that seemingly coincide with a state’s reconsideration of its 
statutory trust code: the enactment of a trust decanting statute and the repeal 
of the common law rule against perpetuities.”159 The same author further 
noted: “A trust decanting statute that is coupled with a statutory repeal of 
the rule against perpetuities potentially provides a powerful mechanism to 
extend the term of irrevocable trusts.”160 Existence of a RAP provision 
holds great significance for states that are exploring the possibilities of trust 
decanting statutes.  
Oklahoma still adheres to the RAP, with its provisions contained in both 
the Oklahoma Constitution and the Oklahoma Statutes.161 The Oklahoma 
Statutes express the RAP in this way: “The absolute power of alienation 
shall not be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a 
longer period than during the continuance of the lives of persons in being at 
the creation of the limitation or condition plus twenty-one (21) years.”162 
The same prohibition against perpetuities exists in the Oklahoma 
Constitution. Article 2, section 32 says that “[p]erpetuities and monopolies 
are contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall never be allowed, 
nor shall the law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in this 
State.”163 This section of the Oklahoma Constitution is “clearly a product of 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Debra Cassens Weiss, States’ Repeal of Rule Against Perpetuities Creates US 
Aristocracy, Law Prof Says, A.B.A. J. (Jul. 12, 2010, 10:30 A.M.), http://www.abajournal. 
com/news/article/states_repeal_of_rule_against_perpetuities_creatomg_us_aristocracy_law_
prof/ (quoting Professor Ray Madoff). 
 158. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the 
Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2466 (2006). 
 159. Culp & Bennett, supra note 43, at 3.  
 160. Id. 
 161. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 32; 60 OKLA. STAT. § 175.47 (2011). 
 162. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 31 (2011); see also Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 1980 OK 62, ¶ 8, 
610 P.2d 772, 774 (citing Melcher v. Camp, 1967 OK 239, 435 P.2d 107, 111).  
 163. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 32.  
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the Progressive Era, . . . designed to prevent the vast accumulation and 
retention of property in the hands of private individuals.”164  
The placement of the prohibition in the Oklahoma Constitution, the 
Oklahoma Statutes, and case law indicates that the Oklahoma founders 
stood firmly against amassing generational wealth. The opening speech at 
the state constitutional convention in 1906 reflects this strong viewpoint. In 
the speech, Oklahoma constitutional convention President-elect William H. 
Murray gave an address to those gathered to discuss what Oklahoma was, 
what it desired to be, and how best to reflect that in a document meant for 
future generations of Oklahomans.165 During the speech, he spoke out 
powerfully against perpetual land holdings: “And don’t you think this 
tendency to divide the great bodies of real estate would destroy the evils of 
landlordism and promote home-owning in the State of Oklahoma?”166 The 
founding fathers of Oklahoma left a strong message for future generations 
to guard against accumulation of wealth. Indeed, enacting a trust decanting 
statute while simultaneously repealing the RAP could allow multi-
generational retention of wealth to become further entrenched. 
Since Oklahoma’s founding, state legislators have modified their stances 
on multi-generational wealth accumulation. For example, the Oklahoma 
Statutes specifically exempt application of the RAP when “property is 
given, granted, bequeathed, or devised to . . . a charitable use; . . . Literary, 
educational, scientific, religious, or charitable corporations for their sole use 
and benefit.”167 In more recent times, the legislature has continued to drift 
away from the ideals espoused by its Progressive Era originators. The latest 
legislative attempt to repeal the RAP occurred in 2012, introduced by 
Senate Bill 1315.168  
A complication arises if the Oklahoma legislature succeeds in its repeal 
efforts because a repeal triggers the automatic return of common law 
                                                                                                                 
 164. DANNY M. ADKISON & LISA MCNAIR PALMER, THE OKLAHOMA STATE 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 49-50 (2001). 
 165. William H. Murray, President-elect, Address Before the Constitutional Convention 
of the Proposed State of Oklahoma (Nov. 20, 1906), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PROPOSED STATE OF OKLAHOMA 15 (Muskogee 
Printing Co., 1907).  
 166. Id. at 19.  
 167. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 175.47.  
 168. At the close of the 53rd Oklahoma legislature, the bill remained with the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. See Bill Information for SB 1315 (2011-2012), OKLA. ST. 
LEGISLATURE, http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=SB1315&session=1200 (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
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provisions.169 Because the RAP is a common law provision, the procedure 
to repeal the doctrine is more complex.170 The Oklahoma legislature would 
need to take three contemporaneous actions to maximize the benefits of 
trust decanting: (1) repeal the current statutory language that invokes the 
RAP; (2) pass a new statute preventing the common law RAP provision 
from reviving; and (3) amend the Oklahoma Constitution to remove the 
RAP provision from Article II. 
If insufficient political support to completely repeal the RAP continues, 
decanting still could be possible if the legislature “substantially [increases] 
the period during which property may be held in trust,”171 as other states 
have done.172 The legislature could also continue to uphold the RAP while 
carving out a limited exception for trusts. However, this could still result in 
significant complications for practitioners, trustors, and beneficiaries alike. 
As with any decision, the legislature should consider Oklahoma’s history 
as well as its present conditions. Would reforming the Oklahoma 
constitutional and statutory provisions to allow increased holding of wealth 
find approval with the views of the Oklahoma founders? Likely not. The 
state’s first governing officials stood firm against the idea of generational 
wealth. However, while history remains an important source of information 
for decision making, Oklahoma has experienced vast changes since the 
times of its formation. With the financial pressures of the twenty-first 
century—including the widening gap between rich and poor,173 the 
disappearance of the middle class,174 and the “Great Recession”175—
decanting automatically may be viewed in a negative light despite its 
benefits. Should increasing polarization of wealth encourage the Oklahoma 
                                                                                                                 
 169. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 175.50. 
 170. The RAP is traditionally a common law rule. See BORRON, supra note 145, § 1447. 
The Oklahoma common law history of the RAP has been somewhat confusing. For a 
discussion of the statutory changes throughout the last century, see 2 R. ROBERT HUFF & 
VARLEY H. TAYLOR, JR., OKLAHOMA PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE § 38.6 (3d. ed. 2012).  
 171. Zeydel & Blattmachr, supra note 42, at 288. 
 172. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 503(b) (2009) (110 years); FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2)(f) 
(2012) (360 years). 
 173. Press Release, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Wide and Growing Income Gap 
in Most States, New Report Finds (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/ 
cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3861. 
 174. See Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Income Gap Rose, Sign of Uneven Recovery, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/us/us-
incomes-dropped-last-year-census-bureau-says.html?_r=0. 
 175. See generally Catherine Rampell, “Great Recession”: A Brief Etymology, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 P.M.), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-
recession-a-brief-etymology/. 
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legislature to maintain the rules inherited from “Ye Olde Englande” in an 
attempt to encourage economic diffusion? How much should the “dead 
hand” of the past control present actions? If trust decanting statutes are a 
sign of times to come, could the lack of such a statute drive business and 
tax revenue out of the state, potentially hurting the state’s overall economic 
health and further increasing the problems of economic gaps? Oklahomans 
must weigh these questions in order to chart the state’s financial path 
through uncertain times to ensure a prosperous, well-run state for future 
citizens to enjoy.  
C. Social Considerations and Family Structure 
Often, trusts are used to ensure security for succeeding generations. With 
changing social norms, gender roles have shifted over the past century. 
Additionally, certain groups of people that were previously excluded now 
fall within societally accepted definitions of family. However, older trusts 
may exclude potential beneficiaries, even if society would no longer 
support the view espoused by the original trustor.  
1. Women  
Historically, men have controlled the earning and management of 
wealth.176 When a man died, he would often set up a trust for his widow’s 
life or until she remarried.177 Consequently, trusts were created in a way 
that resulted in women having few options to deal with future concerns.178 
These issues still exist, especially if trusts are “based on outdated tax laws” 
or “reflect an era when wives had little experience with, or exposure to, 
financial interests.”179 Times have changed, but the “dead hand” of the past 
may still limit the financial opportunities of women. By moving trust assets 
to a new trust, beneficiaries could receive the full benefits of assets 
intended for them. 
2. Divorce 
The prevalence of and easy access to divorce likely was not anticipated 
or fully appreciated by early trustors. The Colorado Bar’s Family Law 
section considered a decanting statute and sounded an important cautionary 
                                                                                                                 
 176. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 41. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Donald Jay Korn, Busting Trusts, FINANCIAL PLANNING, June 1, 2012, at 121, 
121, available at 2012 WLNR 11570021. 
 179. Id. 
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note.180 It based its objection to trust decanting on the fact that “if approved 
[a decanting statute] would have allowed trustees to engage in divorce 
planning by changing or decanting property remainder interests into mere 
expectancies.”181 For example, a wife could receive her husband’s vested 
property interest as a part of a divorce settlement. If decanting changed a 
trust’s terms in a way that made the interest contingent, that would 
materially harm the wife. Interested parties with no means of intervening in 
trustee actions could fall victim to this possibility.  
Other issues arise when a surviving spouse from a second marriage 
receives income for life but the bulk of the trust will eventually pass to 
children from a first marriage.182 When decanting would require dipping 
into the trust principal to provide an increased income stream for the 
surviving spouse, the children could object on the basis that decanting 
would leave fewer assets in the trust corpus to provide for them in the 
future.183 Trustees are left to mediate between these competing concerns. 
Beneficiary protection measures, such as notice or a clear means of 
objection, could ease the potential pitfalls of divorce and decanting while 
still allowing for flexibility in providing for future needs.184  
3. Adoption and Illegitimacy 
Prior to Oklahoma’s Uniform Adoption Act, which “abolished all pre-
existing differences between adopted and natural children,” adopted and 
illegitimate children did not automatically fall within the scheme of 
intestate inheritance.185 However, with the enactment of the Act, adopted 
children became entitled to the same rights and benefits as biological 
children of a marriage under the descent and distribution statutes.186  
The Oklahoma courts then expounded on the rights of adopted and 
illegitimate children, holding that adopted children were entitled to receive 
an allocation of benefits paid through a workers’ compensation death 
claim.187 Illegitimate children could also inherit from a biological parent,188 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Zuber, supra note 63.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Korn, supra note 179, at 121-22. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See infra Part V.C. 
 185. In re Estate of Flowers, 1993 OK 19, ¶ 1, 848 P.2d 1146, 1148. 
 186. Id. The Oklahoma Adoption Act was replaced by the Oklahoma Adoption Code in 
1994. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7501-1.1 cmt. (2011). 
 187. Stark v. Watson, 1961 OK 17, ¶ 34, 359 P.2d 191, 197. 
 188. In re Estate of Marriott, 1973 OK 85, ¶¶ 17-18, 515 P.2d 571, 573; see also 84 
OKLA. STAT. § 215 (2011); 10 OKLA. STAT. § 55 (repealed 1994). 
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even in the context of a termination of parental rights.189 An expanded 
understanding of the rights of adopted and illegitimate children continues to 
present day and receives wide, if not universal, acceptance in our society.190  
Because of those evolving views, a trust that limits beneficiaries to 
“bodily heirs” or “natural issue” undermines current statutory and societal 
views about adopted and illegitimate children. If the granting language of 
an earlier trust is general, such as “for the benefit of my son’s children that 
are alive at the time of my death,” this general language could include 
adopted or illegitimate children. This language would encompass current 
societal ideals. Without such general language, trust decanting is necessary 
to rectify injustices that hold no place in the expanded modern view of 
family relations. In such a situation, public policy demands that the “dead 
hand” of the past be thwarted.  
4. Same-Sex Relationships  
Estate planning is an important undertaking for many people but is 
essential for same-sex couples seeking to establish legal protections.191 
Oklahoma does not perform same-sex marriages or civil unions, nor does it 
protect domestic partnerships.192 A trust acts as an important safeguard 
                                                                                                                 
 189. Flowers, ¶ 15, 848 P.2d at 1152. 
 190. The legal status of children and its impact on their inheritance rights has continued 
to evolve, but the expanded view remains. See, e.g., In re Estate of Moore, 2001 OK CIV 
APP 76, ¶ 9, 25 P.3d 305, 307 (finding that children retained no intestate inheritance rights 
after their adoption).  
 191. See, e.g., Tara Siegel Bernard, What Gay Unions Don’t Guarantee, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1, 2008, at B8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/01/business/yourmoney/ 
01couples.html; Carol Abaya, Living Wills: Critical for Same Sex Unions, N.J. NEWSROOM 
(Feb. 11, 2011, 7:01 A.M.), http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/healthquest/living-wills-
critical-for-same-sex-unions (medical power of attorney); Fox News 47 Staff, Gay Couple 
Obtains Marriage License for Property Rights Protection, FOX 47 NEWS, http:// 
www.fox47news.com/multimedia/photos/209321741.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (joint 
home ownership). 
 192. A 2004 amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution limited marriage to one man and 
one woman. It reads:  
 A. Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one 
woman. Neither this Constitution nor any other provision of law shall be 
construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be 
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups. 
 B. A marriage between persons of the same gender performed in another 
state shall not be recognized as valid and binding in this state as of the date of 
the marriage. 
 C. Any person knowingly issuing a marriage license in violation of this 
section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.  
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against unexpected circumstances and “may be a better vehicle [than a will] 
to protect the parties’ intentions” because it is less susceptible to familial or 
judicial interference.193 A trust currently operating only to support “Jim and 
his legally married wife” would limit the options of same-sex couples in 
many states. Decanting could provide a vehicle for more certainty within a 
same-sex domestic setting. 
D. Tax Matters 
Rules regarding gift, estate, income, and generation-skipping transfer 
taxes continue to evolve.194 The IRS acknowledged that “decanting is an 
emerging issue with tax consequences that are not completely clear under 
current law.”195 In fact, the IRS requested comments on the tax implications 
of decanting when beneficiaries of the original and decanted trusts are 
inconsistent, indicating that tax ramifications are unsettled.196 Tax 
professionals have suggested safe-harbor guidelines as a way to improve 
certainty about tax consequences.197 Decanting also could be viewed as 
merely a function of a trustee’s lawfully granted powers of appointment. 
Under that reasoning, no adverse tax consequences should result because of 
its exercise.198 Unfortunately, “[l]ittle developed law exists regarding the 
tax consequences of decanting.”199 Because of the current uncertainty and 
the variety of potential statutory consequences at both the federal and state 
                                                                                                                 
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35. A federal district court recently struck down the amendment as 
unconstitutional, though the decision was being appealed at the time of this Comment’s 
publication. Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 
116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014). Additionally, a small loophole exists when both partners 
are Native Americans and the tribal law allows same-sex unions. See Elizabeth Dias, A Gay 
Marriage Loophole for Native Americans, TIME MAG., Nov. 1, 2013, http://nation.time.com/ 
2013/11/01/a-gay-marriage-loophole-for-native-americans.  
 193. BURDA, supra note 1, at 64. 
 194. Oklahoma repealed its gift tax in 1982 and its estate tax in 2010. 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 
901-909 (repealed 1982); 68 OKLA. STAT. §§ 801-827 (repealed 2010); see also David A. 
Carpenter, An Overview of the Oklahoma Estate Tax, 74 OKLA. B.J. 2613 (2003). 
 195. William R. Burford, State Decanting Statutes, in TAX AND NON-TAX ASPECTS OF 
DECANTING IRREVOCABLE TRUSTS, 35, 44 (ALI-ABA 2012), available at TSUB09 ALI-
ABA 35 (Westlaw).  
 196. Internal Revenue Service, Notice 2011-101 (Dec. 27, 2011), available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-101.pdf. 
 197. Michael Cohn, New York CPAs Back Safe Harbor Rules for Trust Decantings, 
ACCOUNTING TODAY, May 23, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 10875010. 
 198. Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Jerold I. Horn & Diana S.C. Zeydel, An Analysis of the Tax 
Effects of Decanting, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 141, 144 (2012).  
 199. Id. at 150.  
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levels, a trustee “should exercise [his] statutory authority . . . only after a 
careful consideration of the potential . . . tax consequences” in any state that 
allows decanting.200 
1. Gift and Estate Taxes 
Much of the revenue-requiring civic aims such as funding education or 
providing safety personnel comes from sources other than the gift and 
estate taxes. However, both of these taxes provide for public benefits as 
well and are implicated in the context of decanting. Additionally, the estate 
tax historically has been “more than a way to fill the government’s coffers. 
It expressed an important policy: the great dynastic fortunes had to be cut 
down in size. The ethos was not too different from the notion underlying 
the rule against perpetuities, or perhaps the rule against accumulations.”201  
When property is transferred from one person to another inter vivos for 
less than the fair market value of the property, a gift tax could arise.202 
Similarly, an estate tax could be implicated when a transfer is made at death 
rather than in life.203 These two taxes are discussed together because the 
federal “gift tax exemption is now unified with the estate tax exemption, 
and has increased from $1 million to $5 million.”204 The increased limit was 
set to revert,205 but Congress acted to keep the lifetime gift and estate tax 
exemptions at $5 million, indexed for inflation.206 For 2013, annual gifts up 
to $14,000 are exempt from federal gift tax.207 Transfers in excess of either 
tax exemption are taxed at a rate of 40%.208  
Without clear authority from state statutory schemes, decanting could 
expose trusts to negative financial ramifications that otherwise could have 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Levin & Flubacher, supra note 32, at 5. 
 201. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 172. 
 202. The Internal Revenue Code indicates that if property is transferred for less than its 
fair market value, the excess amount is deemed a gift and includable in the annual 
calculation. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (2012). 
 203. Id. § 2001(a). 
 204. Amy J. Guss, New Strategies for Estate Planning Clients in a Changing 
Environment, in STRATEGIES FOR TRUSTS AND ESTATES IN NEW YORK, supra note 87, at 1, 3, 
available at 2012 WL 191166.  
 205. Gleicher, supra note 87, at 5-6.  
 206. Marshal S. Grant et al., Fiscal Cliff Averted: Estate, Gift, and GST Tax Changes, 
MONDAQ.COM (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/215054/tax+author 
ities/Fiscal+Cliff+Averted+Estate+Gift+and+GST+Tax+Changes. 
 207. Deborah L. Jacobs, After the Fiscal Cliff Deal: Estate and Gift Tax Explained, 
FORBES MAG. (Jan. 11, 2013, 2:43 P.M.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/ 
01/02/after-the-fiscal-cliff-deal-estate-and-gift-tax-explained/. 
 208. Id. 
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been avoided. For example, the Treasury Regulations imply that decanting 
could trigger taxing provisions if interests are shifted between different 
beneficiaries.209 One author posits that this regulation contemplates a 
voluntary act by the beneficiary.210 He maintains that decanting stems from 
a fiduciary duty, and as an independent act of a trustee stemming from that 
duty, decanting should not trigger tax implications.211  
However, a state’s statutory language determines the amount of 
discretion granted to a trustee.212 Decanting may not be a truly independent 
act of the trustee. If a state requires beneficiary consent to decant, this 
consent potentially could be a voluntary act that triggers taxes. Moreover, 
decanting is intended to create a more favorable situation for its 
beneficiaries; and as such, decanting could be viewed as a constructively 
voluntary act of a beneficiary. 
Another possibility arises if the trustee chooses to decant rather than 
decanting out of necessity. Receipt of more favorable terms or distributions 
from the trust could potentially extend beyond a trustee’s fiduciary duty and 
qualify as a gift to the beneficiaries.213 Or, in the case of a trustee who is 
also a beneficiary, choosing to decant “could be regarded as making a gift if 
that trustee participates in exercising a decanting power.”214 This choice 
could trigger negative tax consequences. 
In a state that retains the RAP, taxes might be triggered when decanting 
extends the vesting period, regardless of a trustee’s authority to decant.215 
Without a repeal of the RAP, potential tax ramifications could detrimentally 
impact the desire to establish an Oklahoma-based trust, especially as the 
number of states with decanting provisions but no RAP restrictions 
continues to increase. Passing a decanting provision without amending or 
abolishing the RAP could invite more problems than decanting would 
solve.  
2. Income Tax  
Income tax arises as the result of a sale or exchange of an asset.216 In one 
view, “[d]ecanting to a further trust . . . should not result in a recognition 
                                                                                                                 
 209. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1997). 
 210. Kern & Shore, supra note 44, at 59. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See generally supra Part III.B. 
 213. Blattmachr et al., supra note 198, at 151. 
 214. Id. at 161.  
 215. Kern & Shore, supra note 44, at 59. 
 216. See I.R.C. § 61 (2006); Blattmachr et al., supra note 198, at 161.  
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event for income tax purposes . . . [because] it would appear that the 
transfer to the new trust should carry out distributable net income from the 
old trust to the new trust.”217 However, this may not be the case. It is well 
settled that “[t]here is, nearly always, the possibility of tax consequences 
from the transfer of property,”218 even when the transfer is an exchange of 
assets with the same fair market value.219 Without clear guidance from the 
IRS, courts would be guided by precedents that hold that an exchange 
results in a realization event, and thus, a tax will be imposed.220 Decanting 
could be viewed as involving no transfer, or it could be seen as exchanging 
one set of assets for another. Further clarification is needed on this point 
before the income tax implications of decanting an existing trust will be 
fully understood. 
3. Grandfathered Exemptions from Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax 
The generation-skipping transfer tax (GST tax) is designed to tax wealth 
in every generation.221 The GST tax levies a tax on a “skip person”222 who 
is “two or more generations younger than the transferor”223 at the time of a 
taxable termination. New York was the first to pass a decanting statute, in 
part because it was attempting to avoid this particular taxation principle.224  
To illustrate the GST Tax, imagine Bruce’s son Gordon is married and 
has a child, Edward. Bruce owns Melody Acres and sets up a trust to 
provide support for the life of Gordon, with the remainder to pass to 
Edward. At Bruce’s death, the assets of Melody Acres form the trust 
corpus, and Gordon receives this support without paying taxes on it. When 
Gordon dies, the trust passes to Edward. Normally, property received 
through a death transfer is exempt from taxation until the receiver sells or 
otherwise disposes of it.225 However, in this case, Gordon’s death is a 
taxable termination and triggers the GST tax. Edward would then be taxed 
on the transfer, preventing a “skip” in generational tax. 
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The GST tax does not apply to grandfathered irrevocable trusts or to 
trusts that have been allocated a GST tax exemption.226 The purpose of the 
GST tax exemption is for “a transfer to an irrevocable trust . . . [to permit] 
multiple generations to benefit from the property without future wealth 
transfer tax cost.”227 The exemption amount of $5 million (indexed for 
inflation) can attach to a trust at its inception.228 Even if the trust principal 
grows beyond the exemption amount, “the trust would never be subject to 
GST tax no matter how large its value at the time of the taxable 
termination.”229 In the example above, with an exemption in place, neither 
Gordon nor Edward would be taxed on the inherited wealth as long as the 
original trust amount did not exceed the exemption amount.  
Because the tax treatment of decanted trusts is not settled, debate exists 
about the GST tax and implications arising from decanting. One author 
cites a Treasury Regulation example230 and declares that “decanting will not 
taint the GST-exempt status of a grandfathered trust” if decanting cannot 
“shift a beneficial interest . . . to a beneficiary at a lower generation [than 
the persons who held the beneficial interest prior to decanting]” and does 
not extend the vesting time of the original trust.231 Another scholar declares 
that “[d]ecanting from a [GST tax exempt] trust . . . potentially could result 
in a loss of exempt status” because “the regulations provide no general rule 
regarding what action would cause loss of grandfathered status” and 
decanting could potentially fail to meet safe-harbor provisions.232  
A decision to decant could destroy a trust’s grandfathered status or 
exemption if switching the trust assets from one trust to another is seen as 
the creation of an entirely new trust. In theory, a trust could keep a tax-
exempt status if the terms of the first trust authorized a trustee to make 
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distributions without consent from beneficiaries or the court.233 In contrast, 
if a trustee who is also a beneficiary decants, this could be seen as a 
beneficiary choosing to form a new trust and gifting himself the benefit of 
more favorable terms, thereby destroying any exemption.234 However, 
assuming state law authorized decanting at the time a trust became 
irrevocable, the state might determine that that decanting did not form a 
new trust. This would allow the trust to retain tax-exempt status, assuming 
the new terms did not extend the vesting time beyond what was 
permissible. Until the IRS renders a decision regarding the tax implications 
of decanting, any number of theories could become reality. 
E. Economic Impact  
The addition of a trust decanting provision coupled with a simultaneous 
repeal of the RAP could provide a potential economic boom. This effect has 
been seen elsewhere. For instance, a “prior empirical study . . . found 
that . . . a state’s abolition of the [RAP] increased its reported trust assets by 
about $6 billion and its average trust account size by roughly $200,000.”235 
Historically low interest rates make establishing trusts an attractive 
option.236 One author pointed to his state’s advantageous trust laws, 
including decanting, as an additional reason to draw retirees to the state 
besides his state’s natural beauty and favorable tax rates.237  
Oklahoma is poised to take advantage of a population migration, with its 
reasonable tax rates, excellent employment opportunities, low cost of 
living, temperate weather, availability of quality healthcare, and sense of 
community spirit and pride.238 Relaxing the current trust laws would 
encourage others to consider the potential benefits of relocating to 
Oklahoma.  
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V. A Suggested Framework for an Oklahoma Trust Decanting Statute239 
A. Trustor Intent 
Trust decanting introduces uncertainty into an activity that exists 
precisely to provide certainty. To reduce insecurities caused by the ability 
to decant, language allowing for continued trustor control must be clear and 
concise. Ideal language would provide that decanting is allowable “unless 
the terms of a testamentary instrument or irrevocable trust expressly 
provide otherwise.” Other state statutes contain similar wording.240 An opt-
out provision could allow for older trusts with less socially acceptable 
provisions to be amended to meet the needs of current beneficiaries but 
would also permit trustors to retain the certainty of expressing wishes for 
property after death. Additionally, requiring precise language limits the 
need for courts to scrutinize circumstances surrounding trust formation to 
ascertain if a trustor’s words or actions imply a favor or disfavor of 
decanting. 
B. Trustee Authority  
First, clarifying the amount of authority given to a trustee and how 
trustee actions are overseen would provide protections for both 
beneficiaries and trustees. By setting forth an acceptable framework of 
expectations, all parties involved in decanting would understand a trustee’s 
boundaries in making decisions about trust assets. Oklahoma should 
implement a hybrid system, like New York’s,241 that differentiates between 
levels of trustee authority. If the trust instrument gives a trustee absolute 
authority, decanting could be considered a logical outgrowth of a trustee’s 
fiduciary duties. If, on the other hand, a trustee possessed only discretionary 
authority, court approval could be utilized to function as a check on a 
trustee’s decision.  
Statutorily defining the difference between “absolute” and 
“discretionary” authority would help determine a trustor’s intent when 
analyzing the amount of authority granted to a trustee. For example, 
absolute power could be defined as the “unlimited right to distribute 
principal that is not modified in any manner.”242 An Oklahoma statute could 
then provide that “in any trust instrument that does not expressly grant an 
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absolute or unlimited right to distribute principal, the trustee shall be 
considered to have discretionary authority.” This establishes that the default 
level of authority is discretionary, but allows a trustor to include additional 
authority by granting an “absolute” or “unlimited” right to distribute.  
Second, trustees should have clear guidance as to how the ability to 
decant impacts fiduciary duties. Some states have inserted language that 
imparts the ability to decant without imposing an affirmative duty to 
decant.243 Oklahoma would do well to insert a similar provision. The 
language could state that “a trustee shall remain subject to all fiduciary 
duties imposed by Oklahoma law and the terms of the trust, but the option 
to decant shall not create an affirmative duty on the trustee to decant 
whenever possible.” This provision would affirm decanting as a function of 
a trustee’s discretion while shielding the trustee from potential 
repercussions if he chooses not to decant in the course of administering a 
particular trust.  
Caution may be the better part of valor. If detriment to beneficiaries 
results from a trustee’s choice to decant, there is no defined mechanism to 
“re-pour” the assets from the new trust back into the original trust. It 
actually may be impossible to mimic the original trust after decanting has 
occurred. Trustees should carefully consider all potential ramifications of 
decanting before taking any action.  
C. Beneficiary Protections 
First, Oklahoma would be wise to include a notice provision in any 
statutory enactment. While trustees have discretion in carrying out a 
fiduciary duty, this independence does not preclude the possibility of 
notifying beneficiaries beforehand and allowing time for any potential 
protest. The Oklahoma legislature could state that “written notice of the 
proposed action and a copy of the proposed instrument or amendment shall 
to be given to all existing and future beneficiaries, by certified mail, not less 
than sixty (60) days prior to an action being taken.” Advance written notice 
affords an opportunity for objections and court action before an irreversible 
action is taken.  
Second, Oklahoma has an opportunity to address how objections are 
made. Notice of objection could be provided to a trustee in a variety of 
ways. Requiring written objection within that sixty-day period would 
provide more surety than verbal notice. A protective sentence should 
declare, “Existing and future beneficiaries must make any objections in 
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writing to the trustee before the expiration of the notice period. If no 
objection is received before the expiration of the notice period, the trustee 
shall be free to exercise such power pursuant to his authority.” Use of 
notice and objection provisions would serve to inform all parties of actions 
being taken and ensure fair and open dealings.  
Third, changes to a trust should be in writing and filed with the original 
trust for purposes of clarity. The statute could state: “All changes to the 
trust implemented under a decanting provision must be in writing and filed 
with the records of the original trust.” This provides proof of changes, 
allowing beneficiaries to track previous actions.  
Fourth, a provision that prevents a trustee who is also a beneficiary from 
initiating a decanting action without approval from other beneficiaries is an 
important safeguard. Imagine a family trust where the benefits of the assets 
are divided between three siblings, with the eldest acting as the trustee. In 
some states, if the eldest wanted to decant and had the requisite authority, 
he could do so without the other two siblings being able to stop his actions. 
Missouri’s decanting statute provides guidance for including this additional 
protective measure. Oklahoma’s statute could mimic that of Missouri,244 
saying: “No trustee of the first trust may exercise authority to distribute 
from the first trust to a second trust if such trustee is a beneficiary of the 
first trust without obtaining written authority from all the beneficiaries of 
the first trust.” Such a provision protects those affected by a decanting 
action while allowing necessary or desired changes. 
Fifth, the beneficiaries of the new trust should remain the “same” as 
those of the old trust. To ensure clarity and lessen the chance of legal 
battles, the beneficiary provision of a decanting statute could state, “The 
newly-formed trust shall benefit the same beneficiaries as benefited under 
the previously-existing trust.” However, to maximize both flexibility and 
certainty, trustors should be allowed to amend the beneficiaries of the 
original irrevocable trust in the same way already provided for in the 
Oklahoma Statutes.245 Modeled after the Statutes, the provision should 
stipulate, “Beneficiaries may be added or removed by the trustee only with 
the written consent of all living persons having a vested or contingent 
interest therein.” This permission is especially important because expanding 
a beneficiary class could implicate the rule against perpetuities or cause 
adverse tax consequences. While allowing for an expanded beneficiary 
class could result in uncertainty and litigation, requiring beneficiary 
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approval should mitigate the potential negative effects. Perhaps more than 
any other provision, setting forth a beneficiary provision would require the 
Oklahoma legislature to weigh the demands of society against simplicity.  
Lastly, virtually all of the states provide that decanting should not occur 
unless the pouring-over of the assets implicates no change in the income 
receivable by the beneficiaries or the tax consequences of the trust.246 
Workability and feasibility issues may arise, but the inclusion of such a 
provision in an Oklahoma decanting statute would protect beneficiaries 
from unwise decanting by invalidating a unilateral trustee action if it 
violated statutorily limited authority. To clarify a position of income, the 
Oklahoma legislature could echo Missouri’s statutory language: “The 
exercise of such authority may not reduce any income interest of any 
income beneficiary.”247 For tax consequences, Oklahoma could mimic 
Nevada’s statute:  
[A] trustee may not appoint property of the original trust to a 
second trust if: . . . A contribution made to the original trust 
qualified for a marital or charitable deduction for federal or state 
income, gift or estate taxes or qualified for a gift tax exclusion 
for federal or state tax purposes and the terms of the second trust 
include a provision which[,] if included in the original trust[,] 
would prevent the original trust from qualifying for the tax 
deduction or exclusion.248  
As with any statutory provisions, clarity is key to subsequent 
implementation. Precise legislative language and a detailed legislative 
record outlining the benefits and purposes of each provision would help 
guide regulators, judicial officers, practitioners, and trust administrators in 
creating flexible yet dependable instruments for future prosperity. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Trends indicate that this far-reaching tide of trust law changes will 
continue to grow. Trust law in Oklahoma should progress, especially in this 
era of sweeping statutory reform. Decanting could help to rectify some of 
the injustices of the past, in keeping with a more modern, liberalized view 
of society. Furthermore, Oklahoma stands to lose economic benefits to 
other states if the needs of its residents are not being met under its current 
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laws and can be better met elsewhere. Reforming the RAP provisions found 
in the Oklahoma Constitution and Statutes might be politically daunting, 
but such reforms would be worthwhile to keep Oklahoma competitive.  
The need to progress, however, should not cause Oklahoma to abandon 
historic and well-established principles of estate law. Advancement must be 
accomplished in a deliberate and thoughtful manner, preserving as much of 
the time-honored certainty inherent in choosing, via trust instruments, how 
assets earned during a person’s life will be treated in the future. With 
careful stipulations, the spirit of equality found in the desire of the 
Progressive Era to ensure maximum financial stability for the greatest 
number of Oklahomans can and should be maintained while also providing 
flexibility for future wealth stability planning and management.  
 
Tara M. Niendorf 
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